Regulatory cost-benefit analysis of accounting information

Abstract: The accounting Information of listed companies is a key factor in the effectiveness of one of the securities market, the Government's regulatory activities in this area should be based on the cost of regulation is greater than the basis of regulation. From the existing Research results, the domestic orientation at the macro level, Research Information using a disciplined approach regulatory issues, supervision of accounting Information than the cost of the Research on the regulatory return. should combine the two, using cost-Benefit Analysis model, to explore a reasonable range of government regulation and government regulatory effectiveness.

Keywords: accounting Information; regulatory costs; Benefit Analysis

Abstract: The listed company's accounting Information is a key factor affecting the effectiveness of one of the securities markets, so the Government's regulatory activities in this area should be based on the basis of regulatory benefits in excess of regulatory cost. Read from the existing Research results, the domestic macro level tend to use regulatory approach to study information regulation, and pay attention to the regulatory costs of accounting information rather than profitability. We should combine the two to explore a reasonable range of government regulation and effectiveness using cost -Benefit Analysis model.

Keywords:: accounting information; regulatory cost; Benefit Analysis

Stock market trading partners and trading virtual both asymmetry determines the importance of information. However, the information value of the intangible and the uncertainty of the market mechanism alone makes it difficult to achieve balance between supply and demand, for the government securities market regulatory activities spontaneously. securities regulators to some extent alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand information to improve the value of information in decision-making and market efficiency, in view of government regulation to the stock market will bring some negative effects, and its regulatory effectiveness are also constantly challenged by people. This means of cost-Benefit Analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of government regulation, and explore a reasonable range of government regulation.


First, the literature review

securities market activities to the 20th century as a turning point in the 30's, before the industry self-regulatory organization is mainly distributed monitoring the implementation of the worldwide Economic crisis .1929-1933 years, gave birth to the production of government regulation patterns, and rapid promotion. Government regulation for the rapid Economic recovery, improve the quality of information played an important role, but also by a certain amount of criticism. Stigler (Stigler, 1964) through empirical Research, that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's mandatory disclosure of accounting information system does not give Investment , bringing practical benefits; the Princeton (Benston, 1969,1973) of the empirical research that the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the disclosure requirements of the investors do not have obvious value, and no securities of the transaction can be measured to the positive impact.

The cost of information disclosure can not be ignored, and it includes the preparation of detailed financial reports of direct costs, leaking valuable information to competitors, the cost of delay cost on securities sales, investors believe that the cost of such misleading information. Jensen and Mei Franklin (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) also believe that mandatory disclosure of information is not intended to increase investor returns. Zhou (Chow, 1983) studies have shown that increased regulation of accounting information of enterprises of individual and social costs, and almost no there is good evidence. Watts and Zimmerman (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) that the information control not only the direct cost of resources, but also affect Investment, production and financing decision-making, and this effect is not necessarily improve the Pa tired of being asked the meaning of Law.

Ross (Ross, 1979) on the legislation of information disclosure on the financial markets, the costs and benefits were studied, the benefits that information control is mainly reflected in two aspects of enhancing the effectiveness and fairness, control costs include the Economic impact of legislation on the market, there is a direct the cost of implementing the indirect costs of such legislation exists. Easterbrook and Fisher (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1985) to control the cost of securities classified as direct costs and indirect costs, including direct costs include: the compilation of information, dissemination, litigation The cost and the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the parties involved in the disclosure process the opportunity cost in time, and the disclosure of documents and the printing and mailing costs of disclosure rules; disclosure of indirect costs is mainly caused companies to abandon the project can be profitable operating losses and information noise inconvenience to the investors in their decisions; the study concluded that no satisfactory data show that the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulations is beneficial.

China's stock market started late on the cost-effectiveness of securities regulation is relatively small, only in recent years attracted attention. Yang Rong, Song (2002) will cause the cost of securities regulation is divided into direct and indirect costs of loss of efficiency of resources direct resource costs, including the implementation of regulatory control the resources consumed by the process of being regulated for compliance with regulatory and resource consuming, that administrative costs and enforcement costs; indirect loss of efficiency due to being regulated mainly refers to the original behavior change welfare losses caused by, mainly for moral hazard, the low efficiency of static and dynamic low efficiency. Lvxiao Mei (2004), the cost of regulatory accounting information will be divided into explicit and implicit costs, explicit costs include the costs of organizing control system implementation costs and subsequent costs, hidden costs include the cost caused by asymmetric information, compliance costs, and net social welfare loss; gains control of accounting information to investors on the market mainly fraud and market failure is expected to reduce the the increase brought the total Investment.

Ng Shui Peng, Bi Xiuling (2002) considered the effect of government accounting regulation should be considered in evaluation of social benefits and social costs, including social benefits mainly for users of accounting information to improve decision-making level, so that the optimal allocation of resources to achieve the degree of concrete and recognized accounting regulatory measures into the extent of the improvement of accounting information asymmetry degree of the reduction rate of false accounting information, and the degree of international coordination process, etc.; social costs of consumption of both direct costs, such as for institutions management (including civil service wages), consulting, design, printing, publicity, promotion, change, guidance, training, cost of ownership, as well as indirect costs of consumption, such as being regulated system conversion costs, rent-seeking costs, reduced efficiency cost, opportunity cost. Wei Li (2000) from the amount of capital formation, capital allocation efficiency, the dispersion of Investment risks, the construction of modern enterprise system, capital and market liquidity and other aspects of securities regulation in 16 results were studied.

View from the existing research results, mostly abroad, to study the use of empirical methods of a regulatory rules on capital markets, the domestic macro level tend to use standardized methods of information control problem, the cost of regulatory accounting information more in the study of regulatory benefits, combine the two cost-benefit analysis model used to explore the reasonable control of the region is relatively small.


Second, the cost of regulatory accounting information

Regulatory costs is caused by the activities of all regulatory resources in a reasonable cost, including direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs are those regulators and the regulated activities for monitoring all reasonable expenses incurred; indirect costs caused by regulatory activities is efficiency losses, such as improper supervision of the regulator and the regulated to change the original behavior and the social welfare loss, competition or regulatory activities of the market impact of market innovation. From the perspective of those who bear the cost of regulatory costs can be implementation costs into the regulators, the regulated compliance costs and social welfare losses, including implementation costs and compliance costs are generally the scope of direct costs, while indirect costs are loss of social welfare content.

Links to Research Papers Download http://www.hi138.com (a) monitor the implementation costs of those
The implementation of the cost of the regulator is the regulator in order to effectively carry out monitoring activities occur every reasonable resource consumption, including regulatory rules of the specific costs, regulatory costs and regulatory monitoring the implementation process of information gathering costs. A statute The introduction of the proposal need to go through the draft for comments, modify, through the enactment of many other links, many times repeated, prolonged, and its development costs are generally higher. regulations include not only regulatory compliance costs and regulatory staff to implement the to pay the cost of supervision and regulations, including regulations promulgated after the publicity, interpretation, guidance, training and other costs. rule-making and implementation is the same strain, in the development process, we need to consider the feasibility and ease of implementation, high costs may be difficult to achieve the implementation of the rules of the target. securities regulatory rule-making and implementation are based on certain information, based on sufficient information to ensure that the regulatory rule-making is rational and effective operation of the premise, and information collection, collation, analysis , feedback and other activities requires a lot of resources, regulators have to pay the information costs are high.

U.S. Congress to implement the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, set up a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to unify the management of corporate information disclosure. Although the development of accounting standards SEC the right to delegate to private accounting profession, in certain extent, reduce the regulatory costs, but also issued a large number of its own series of announcements and related accounting disclosure rules, these rules, implementation costs are enormous .1936, Congress transferred to the SEC, $ 3,000,000 total funding , 1980 reached 7230 million [6] SEC's funding in 1991 reached 19 $ 3,000,000 [8]. After Enron, SEC disclosure regulation in order to strengthen its budget as high as seven thousand seven hundred million million U.S. dollars [2]. Britain's securities regulatory costs is relatively high, Lamai Si (D. Lomax) studies have shown that only the United Kingdom Securities and Investments Commission (SIB) of the administrative costs for up to 500 million pounds, together with other self-management organization, estimated at 2 000 million pounds, if coupled with other regulatory bodies operating costs, this number more than 100 million pounds [4].

(B) the cost of compliance by regulators
Compliance costs is the result of compliance by regulators, the implementation of regulatory rules and costs, also known as compliance costs, including institutions operating costs, information costs, system conversion costs. Enterprises in order to rule in accordance with regulatory requirements, timely and effective and high quality of external information, you need to set the appropriate agencies and professionals equipped to collect, collate, compile, publish accounting information and appraisal by an independent third party, which not only takes a certain amount of resources to ensure that these institutions normal operation, the information need to pay the high cost and additional forensic information gathering costs. particularly in disclosure regulation resulted in additional disclosure requirements, which is not much information on the value of the internal decision-making, the information generation costs is huge (eg, replace the existing corporate disclosure requirements of the market cost of capital equipment, etc.). When a new regulatory rules replace the old rules, is controlled by the system this transition will have to pay a certain cost, that is, learning cost, old and new systems The convergence of costs and contract costs redrafted.

Philip and Zeqie Er (1981) shows that in 1975 U.S. companies by SEC's 10-K ,10-Q and 8-K form of the statements of changes in costs paid by 21 300 million. Bass Tabo ( 1977) by investigating 13 companies under SEC No. 190 <"Accounting statement>> (ASR-190) (1976 年 3 月 issued) in the request for the disclosure replacement cost of inventory and plant equipment, where data found for this company more cost to an average of 12 400 U.S. dollars [6] In 2002 the United States Sarbanes - Oxley Act (SOX) to strengthen the requirements on information disclosure, but also increased costs by the regulator. a survey of U.S. listed companies to follow SOX costs between about 1.3-2.5 million [8]. Poonam Puri & Anindya Sen (2003) study found that costs of SOX led to increased corporate accounting 105%, from 000 per 243 increased to 499,000 yuan; Lawyer costs 90.6%, from 210,000 yuan to 404,000 yuan. Zhou Qinye et al (2003) cost of the 2001 disclosure survey shows that China's information disclosure of listed companies in 2001 the average cost 1,323,300 million, net of the maximum value of petrochemical samples (6696 million), the sample average company cost of information disclosure is still up to 1.1915 million yuan, the average daily cost of information disclosure administrative expenses accounted for 4.09%. According to the United Kingdom Financial Services Act of 1986 projections, the Government regulatory compliance costs of at least 100 million pounds.

Despite regulatory compliance costs borne by the object can raise the price of products or services appropriate to pass on to consumers, but what can be passed on and passed on the degree of high or low, depending on supply and demand of the service flexibility and other factors. Therefore, the high compliance costs may make companies overwhelmed, or increase the burden on consumers, which are contrary to the regulation in mind.

(C) the efficiency of regulation-induced losses
Supervision of listed companies in the information disclosed to monitor, due to the complexity of information value, there is a useful decision-making needs and reflect the conflict between the needs of fiduciary duty, there are different needs of the conflict between the needs of desire, which makes regulators can not know the optimal amount of information needs, or from a social point of view, the appropriate amount, which is the main reason for monitoring lead to loss of efficiency. regulatory activities of the efficiency losses caused mainly in the following areas:
1. Regulation could undermine competition in the market
Supervision is a free and competitive market human intervention, it changed the rules of free competition, is a redistribution of social resources. In the whole regulatory activities, there must be a winners and losers, because of regulatory beneficiaries rules to obtain the monopolistic interests, damaged or difficult to maintain, or exit, or to lobby the Government to change regulatory rules, both in an unequal competitive position, undermined the principle of equity markets. Stigler (Stigler, 1964) The empirical analysis of the U.S. SEC regulation of the stock market price changes before and after the discovery, SEC's main effect is to control the new company will be excluded from the market. In addition, severe over-regulation not only improve the company's compliance costs, also reduces the enterprises to enter the enthusiasm of the market, reducing the attractiveness of the market and competitiveness, resulting in the loss of national interests .20 SEC is aware of the 90's unduly strict disclosure rules of the U.S. capital market development, and actively with other regulators cooperation to find solutions.

2. Regulatory efficiency losses caused by the lag of
Government intervention in the securities market and effective disclosure of market information depends on a comprehensive, timely and accurate grasp, partial, outdated and inaccurate information will inevitably bring in decision making and management of the other. As regulators in the social hierarchy spire, from market activities, the longer the chain of access to information, coupled with the information transmission delay, distortion, making the regulator on the market, there is awareness of the problems occurring delay, delay decision-making, implementation and entry into force delay delay, which occurs when the regulatory rules to run when the market environment and the development of different market environment, the effect is difficult to give full play to the rules, or even restricting Economic development, hinder market innovation.

3. Regulatory decisions on the moral hazard caused by
Regulation is the constraints of the Economic activities of enterprises, it may change the corporate decision making, risk-taking behavior or intentional, or unintentional cautious and so may enable enterprises to take unnecessary opportunity cost. Regulation is created for investors effective and credible information environment, reduce the information asymmetry caused by the decision-making mistakes, but regulators are also easy to give a false impression created that the regulation does not break the rules are safe, so investors have too much government regulation of the target trust, reduce risk awareness and screening capabilities, which to some extent, contributed to blindly type of irrational speculation and dependence on government is expected to protect the city, adds to the probability of an invalid configuration of resources.

4. Regulatory rent-seeking behavior caused by the waste of social resources caused
Supervision is a right distribution of power by means of the part of some to impose restrictions on others, is the political power involved in the economic market. The Government's monopoly control over the government officials are prone to set rents and rent seeking by regulators to avoid the phenomenon of rent. The so-called "rent" means a supply of factors of production due to natural stocks, government regulation, resulting from various factors such as difficult to meet the demand in the market, the price difference arising from time to time. This post offers an opportunity for the rent-seeking behavior, rent-seekers through lobbying , bribery and other means to get the opportunity to have a spread of factors of production, and have the resources to monitor the right to government officials in addition to those who passively accept the return of rent-seeking or corruption, may also be directly used their power to "political rent-creating" and "pumping rent "in order to seek personal gains. the existence of rent-seeking behavior makes a lot of scarce resources on a non-productive areas, reducing the production of resource allocation, resulting in waste of social resources, but also eroded some government officials, hazardous the healthy development of the social fabric. reposted elsewhere in the Research Papers Download http://www.hi138.com III-benefit analysis of regulatory accounting information

Monitoring the implementation of the Government of the benefits of accounting information is mainly reflected in the improvement of information quality and reduce the differences in terms of supply and demand, thus reducing the cost of screening information on information users, reduce the expected investors in the fraud and increase investor trading surplus of resources configuration of the "Pareto optimal."
(A) reduce the information asymmetry and improve the efficiency of resource allocation
The regulatory control of accounting information in order to compensate for the congenital defect of market competition - the overall interests of the individual interests of the expansion can not lead to optimal and the interests of all parties to establish an effective game for the system, the ultimate goal is to reduce the information asymmetry to achieve balance between supply and demand information. According to theory of asymmetric information, market information available on the buyer and the seller is different, usually the seller has more information than the buyer. have information advantages seller hopes the information out to their advantage to make their own profit, and have the information disadvantage of the buyer to obtain information through various means to reduce their risk. Because the characteristics of accounting information production makes the internal and external users of information between the different users of external information exists between significant information asymmetries, it is not only in quantity, but also in quality; both asymmetric information in advance, there are ex post information asymmetry.

Information asymmetry is induced by the stock market the source of all problems in advance of the asymmetry lead to "adverse selection" (adverse selection), after the asymmetry caused by "moral hazard" (moral hazard). Adverse selection and moral hazard exists reduces the efficiency of market allocation of resources, undermining the market economy principle of maximization of social benefits, leading to a net loss of social welfare. control adverse selection and moral hazard, the most effective measures is to ask the party has full information superiority information disclosure to weaken their information advantage. So there was the disclosure of listed companies a range of institutional constraints and the adequacy of its disclosure and fairness of the appraisal, generally accepted accounting standards and independent auditing system came into being. financial reports of listed companies through the public disclosure of information, especially beyond the statutory disclosure requirements for the voluntary disclosure, with some signal display function, can solve some of the adverse selection problem, to promote the rational form of trade or contract. accounting information Control of the role of moral hazard not only signed the shareholders and managers to motivate managers to take actions consistent with shareholder objectives of the employment contract as a contracting payment indicators, and to provide contract oversight, implementation of the basis, is also reflected in the information decision usefulness of the stock market and the corresponding support of the manager of the market. because the competitive market for the securities market and the manager manager's moral hazard constitutes the external constraints, the quantity and quality of accounting information will be reflected in stock prices and Managers value. a reliance on the disclosure of false information to deceive the market manager, will eventually be eliminated by the market.

(B) The Government will monitor the transaction cost savings
Competition in the securities market is essentially competitive information, the competitive process is in fact a search, inspection and confirmed the value of information process. But because of the value of information can not be evaluated before, only to existing knowledge, experience and capacity, to collect an estimated level of information content, and trial and error approach to decision-making. Once the information is insufficient or collected searching the error message, to bear the huge cost of making mistakes. The Government of information generated through the development of mandatory disclosure rules can reduce the information collection costs and improve the quality of information and transparency, reduce or error information is not sufficient information to influence decision-making, reduce the transaction costs of the whole society. This is because (1) under the control of the non-accounting information, each Investment who needs to be involved in decision-making information search, even though the individual's search activity is greater than the cost-effectiveness in the information under the principle, but the individual rationality does not represent the collective reason, many individuals repeat the search with the same information in the individual search information, cost, and may be far greater than the information control costs; (2) The ability of investors to the difference between the individual's search activity will increase the information asymmetry of information, increasing trade friction. (3) to provide foreign enterprises The accounting information is the product of internal accounting system, the marginal cost is small, if not control of accounting information, information users will be the monopoly price for each purchase of the same company the same information, not only increase the asymmetry of information, but also resulting in waste of social resources. Therefore, we can say that regulation of accounting information relative to non-control purposes is a "Pareto improvement." Little John • Kofi (John C. Coffee, 1984) that the mandatory disclosure system is an ideal cost reduction strategy, which search for information on the cost of social benefits and the amount of information to ensure accuracy of the information. there is no mandatory disclosure system would lead to more serious inefficiencies.

Information control transaction cost savings to society is built on the premise of rational control, and once more than a reasonable degree of control over information that could lead to waste of social resources. Because not only increases control over enterprise information production costs, More serious is the result of accounting information "stacking", and to improve the analysis of the cost of information, reducing the use of information value to users of information loss.


Fourth, the government the choice of an appropriate regulatory

Government regulation is an effective remedy market failures, but it can not solve all the problems of market failure, government activities there are some failures, and sometimes government failure is more terrible than market failure. Therefore, the information the government securities market regulatory rules introduction of caution, should have full cost-benefit analysis, only when the regulatory benefits outweigh the regulatory costs, regulatory policy was feasible and effective. where the cost-effectiveness must consider not only the regulators and the regulated can be directly measured costs, but also to consider monitoring the activities on the impact of social and economic development, assess the efficiency of regulatory policy-induced losses. Although regulatory costs and benefits of accurate measurement of a certain degree of difficulty, but still the help of cost-benefit analysis model to look for government regulation a reasonable range and regulatory strength.

Figure 1, R = F (Q) for the regulation of the yield curve, it meets the Law of diminishing returns; C = F (Q) for the regulation of the cost curve, which consists of fixed costs and variable costs of two parts, the variable cost determines the line slope. The figure shows that when monitoring the degree Q 1, the monitoring costs than monitoring benefits, there has been a net loss of regulation, which is inadequate supervision of performance; when Q ₁ 0, the regulatory benefits outweigh the regulatory costs, and dR / dQ> 0, increase the degree of supervision is a "Pareto improvement"; when Q ₀ 2, even though income is still greater than the regulatory costs of regulation, but because of dR / dQ <0, increase the degree of supervision is no longer consistent with the principles of economic efficiency; when Q> Q _2, the regulatory costs than regulatory effectiveness, regulatory activities to the economic development brought a net loss, there has been excessive regulation. Therefore, the government regulatory activities only in the interval [Q ₁ Q _2] to choose, where Q0 is the best control points, for the supervision of the "Pareto optimal." degree of government regulation but can not be a precise point, but a dynamic variable, so the government regulatory agreement interval [Q ₀ - △ Q ₀ + △].

Government regulation of the interval should be the area of ​​market failure, or high cost areas of market regulation, but through market mechanisms for achieving effective regulation of the field, the government need not intervene. Even in the area of ​​government information control, but also gives companies some flexibility, to a certain extent, to encourage voluntary disclosure of corporate behavior, because rules can not be made on all aspects of comprehensive requirements. a good strong regulatory rules are not completely restricted individual freedom, but in the cost of the case of minimum cost to achieve its objectives, which means that market discipline should take full account of the strength and the feasibility of self-discipline market players. not to limit government control, weakening the power of market players, but the right to guide the market to fully play its self-regulatory organization their regulatory advantage. Therefore, the Government's modest self-regulation and market regulation should be organically integrated, mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure should be organically integrated, and information should be provided free of charge for the organic integration of market regulation.


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