Environmental accounting information disclosure Game Analysis

[Abstract] As environmental issues become more prominent, build a sustainable society has become more urgent, require companies to disclose environmental accounting information has become a trend now, China's enterprises for environmental accounting information disclosure are still many problems. To better understand the impact of environmental accounting information disclosure reasons, can the relationship between the main stakeholders to game analysis article by the relevant stakeholders on the three game analysis, the disclosure of accounting information to improve the environment strategy to effectively achieve environmental protection and sustainable development.

[Key Words] environmental accounting information, game theory, the main interest

I. Introduction

As environmental issues become more prominent and gradually increase awareness of environmental protection, environmental accounting is increasingly subject to world governments, businesses and the public's attention, environmental accounting, environmental accounting information disclosure as a basic core of the problem and, naturally became the focus of primary problem. China from the early 1990s, environmental accounting research, at present, environmental accounting, in particular the disclosure of environmental accounting theory and practice have made great development, but there are still many problems, such as environmental accounting disclosure of corporate information ratio is not high, and the disclosure is incomplete, non-standard way, environmental information of low quality, poor availability, authenticity is not high, environmental accounting information disclosure laws, regulations and guidelines are inadequate, the government and Public disclosure of environmental accounting information for regulatory and supervision is not urgent, not active, etc. In this paper, game theory, for the environmental resources of the main stakeholders of our environmental analysis of accounting information disclosure in order to seek the disclosure of accounting information to improve the environment strategy.


Second, the environmental analysis of accounting information disclosure game

As a non-exclusive environmental resources, environmental resources, not just every natural person consumers, but also depend on environmental resources for production or product impact on the environment of the enterprise, in this case, there have been ownership and use of environmental resources The separation, therefore, environmental resources, a wide range of relevant stakeholders in the environment should be the main users of accounting information, including government, public, business owners and shareholders of these stakeholders from different angles and in varying degrees to promote or resist environmental accounting information disclosure.

(An analysis of government and business game
Government and business interests as a different subject, the object of concern must be inconsistent. Business as a for-profit organization, to maximize their own economic interests of its most fundamental goal, therefore, conducive to enterprise value as long as the activities of companies may achieve their goals while ignoring the other subjects of interest and that the Government because of their special roles and status, it must focus on public utilities, has put forward the task of sustainable development, defined the importance of environmental protection for the people daily life and long-term interests of society. So, as an evaluation of corporate environmental and resource use and protection of environmental quality and to predict future risk based on the disclosure of environmental accounting information has become a matter of course the object of the game business and government. Here, the assumption that government For information the disclosure of corporate environmental accounting is not supervised, and supervision of two cases, companies have disclosed the face of the Government's request and not disclose environmental accounting information both cases, you can build the following game model (see Table 1:

In the course of this game, if an enterprise of environmental accounting information disclosure, will have to spend -5 costs, the Government should spend -5 supervision costs, but if government oversight is true disclosure of corporate environmental accounting information, then he will companies certain tax incentives, the public will be given some praise for the company to improve corporate social reputation, companies can get benefits at 10, but if the Government found that companies did not disclose environmental accounting information, it will impose a -10 fine if the government inaction, the environment is not any accounting information disclosure regulation will be subject to public condemnation, the loss suffered -1 from Table 1 shows the static game the only Nash equilibrium is ( -1,0, the companies have chosen not to disclose environmental accounting information, the Government is not the information of environmental accounting for strong regulation, this is our current status of environmental accounting information disclosure, while also obtained from Table 1, then the Nash equilibrium The total social benefits are not the highest, and only 1, but not the public want most of the status quo, therefore, such a situation, should develop a more rational system of China's current environmental disclosure and accounting information to improve oversight, makes the balance to the effective monitoring and direction of the transfer of corporate disclosure.

Therefore, the public in the middle of it played a significant role in the potential, if the face of government inaction, the public strongly condemned the attitude to take more, without making the government more as a loss, such as to -5, if the public the Government's effective monitoring, response and should be given more support to government oversight of the income of 3, then the Nash equilibrium at this time will be disclosed to government oversight and direction of change in business, namely (3,5, while the total social earnings will be significantly increased, to 8, the results in Table 2 on the other hand, the Government can focus on research and development of methods of supervision, reduce the cost of making the regulation, efficiency, and help balance the direction of the optimal transfer.


(Two companies and the public's Game Analysis
The game in business and public relations, corporate environmental accounting information providers, the public is the information needs of those as two different subjects of interest, of course, their goals are different, but also benefit their own interests will choose maximizing behavior, so between them, it is difficult to reach agreement on information disclosure standards, so businesses and the public should be a game between the short-term non-cooperative game in this game, assuming the public face is a listed company, the corporate strategy of optional disclosure or false disclosure of true, then the public disclosure of information for business, you can choose to buy the company stock or purchase, the time of the game model can be seen in Table 3:

True if the information providers to fully disclose environmental accounting information, rational investors will make investment decisions based on real information, to maximize the effectiveness of social resources in the most effective use, however, can be seen from Table 3, No matter what the public choice, corporate environmental accounting information disclosure or false disclosure of non-disclosure of income than the real big, so can be inferred, in the static game in a one-time, companies will always choose from their own interests or the disclosure of false full disclosure, and rational public enterprises may also be expected to act, to choose not to buy the company stock. then the results of the static game is that both sides gain, respectively (5,4 combination constitutes a Nash equilibrium, ie businesses to choose a false disclosure of environmental accounting information, the public not to buy, then the total social gains of 9.

Links to free download http://www.hi138.com the equilibrium point is not what we expected, this result is not conducive to business development, revenue maximization is not conducive to the public, therefore, should At this point the state of reasonable improvement can be disclosed by increasing the real income gains and reduce false disclosure two options, to enable enterprises to choose a true disclosure of environmental accounting information, and the public to purchase the company stock, thereby enabling the self-interest of both are maximized, then the game can also be achieved optimal balance.

True for improving the disclosure of income, can take the strategy is to select the appropriate incentives that the government can disclose the real business to give more incentives and tax incentives, the public disclosure of the real companies to give more praise. Or strengthening of environmental accounting information disclosure methods and techniques, to enable enterprises to reduce disclosure costs, thereby increasing the real income disclosed at this time game model can be transformed into Table 4:

Reduce false disclosure of information for benefits, the strategy can be taken to strengthen supervision and punishment, and the use of power of the media, the disclosure of false negative publicity companies, making the company's public image lower down the social goodwill, which making a false disclosure of corporate earnings lower, businesses and the public at this time game model can be transformed into Table 5 Table 3.

(Three business owners and shareholders of Game Analysis
The enterprise's internal management, shareholders consider is the value of the appreciation, while the operator is to consider their own interests, therefore, shareholders in order to maximize their own interests, will choose different incentives to encourage operators to make consistent with its objectives and its common for enterprises to maximize profits, but operators can also choose not to accept the incentives of shareholders, still in their own way to management. At this point, you can construct a game model in Figure 1:

Figure 1 Dynamic model of repeated games can be seen, the business and shareholders who ultimately will choose to stand on the same side of environmental accounting information for selective disclosure, that disclosure only have good effects on enterprise efficiency aspects, and disclosure of bad or false information is not disclosed, so as to achieve the maximization of corporate interests, but at this time is not necessarily the interests of society as a whole reached a maximum, so for the supervision of shareholders and managers, as well as their environmental education concepts and professionalism will play a significant role.


Third, the conclusion

Through the disclosure of environmental accounting information between relevant stakeholders in the game analysis, we can see: government, business, public and shareholders are to varying degrees, the disclosure of accounting information on the environment play a catalytic role, but will in some ways impede the disclosure of environmental accounting information from companies to disclose environmental accounting information is inevitable, adequate, timely, reliable, and accurate disclosure is conducive to the improvement of corporate value, is conducive to sustainable development of society, the government, strengthen the oversight and supervision of enterprises, to accelerate the disclosure of environmental accounting information related to the establishment and improvement standards, strengthen legislation and law enforcement efforts to help achieve sustainable development strategy, will help the state and society, in public, the corporate environmental accounting information disclosure of the more real, full, easier to achieve the maximization of public interest, then the public's evaluation of government and corporate and confidence will increase, thereby also improving the environment of goodwill, the government will get more public trust. [References]
[1] Zhang Jinsong Environmental accounting reports of [D]. Heilongjiang: Northeast Forestry University, 2007.

[2] Yao Yao, thorough Environmental accounting information supply and demand sides of the game analysis [J]. Shanghai Lixin Accounting Institute, 2006,20 (4) :8-12.

[3] Lu Chenglong of environmental accounting information disclosure game theory analysis [J]. Sichuan Institute of Technology (Social Science Edition, 2005,20 (1) :117-119.

Links to free download http://www.hi138.com